Unravelling the Puzzle of Social Standards’ Design in EU and US Trade Agreements

The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are signing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) increasingly used as vehicles for exporting social regulation, such as labour and environmental standards. Despite the similarity in terms of the inclusion of such provisions, their design varies greatly between US and EU agreements. The US exports its domestic standards, relying on coercive enforcement, while the EU emphasises international rules and soft measures. Why do US PTAs have stricter social standards than those signed by the EU? Using the principal–agent approach to explain the domestic politics of social provisions in EU and US PTAs, I argue that greater insulation of trade executives from interest groups and legislators results in their ability to set the agreement agenda independently, in accordance with their normative preferences. The argument is supported by case studies and original interview data.     

Agglomeration and Spreading in an Asymmetric World

We study Krugman's core–periphery (CP) model for most general cases of nonidentical regions and fully characterize instant and long‐run equilibria. Assuming immobility of labor, we describe the behavior of equilibrium wages/real wages. Moreover, the relative wages/real wages of industrial workers can both increase and decrease with the population with which they are associated. Under the assumption of industrial labor mobility, possible patterns of economic evolution, as responses to trade freeness, are fully described. We show that in the case of noticeable agricultural asymmetry, all mobile labor inevitably accumulates in countries with larger agricultural populations.     

Target leverage and the costs of issuing seasoned equity

In this paper, I examine the relation between the direct costs of issuing seasoned equity (SEO gross spreads) and the change in deviation of firms’ leverage ratios from their estimated targets following SEOs. If underwriters have bargaining power vis-a-vis issuing firms in setting SEO fees and if the tradeoff theory of capital structure holds, then SEO fees should be negatively related to the post-SEO change in absolute deviation of firms’ leverage ratios from targets. I find that this relation is indeed negative and economically and statistically significant, especially in cases in which underwriters have relatively high bargaining power, suggesting that one of the important determinants of SEO fees is the change in firms’ absolute deviations from their target leverage as a result of issuing seasoned equity, and that underwriters are able to capture part of the value created by firms moving towards their leverage targets.     

Russia: Collapse and Recovery

The financial collapse in Russia in the summer of 1998 was a profound shock to the efforts to reform the Russian economy. It was also thought that it would seriously worsen the short- and medium-term outlook for growth and inflation. In this article, Brian Henry and Evgeny Gavrilenkov argue that the most recent data show that the more pessimistic of these views were probably misplaced; modest but significant growth has been evident since the collapse without substantial increases in inflation. The real improvements, in so far as they are simply the results of devaluation and the beneficial effects of the increase in the world oil price, could prove to be temporary, although there are more hopeful indicators with the recent increases in investment. But to ensure sustainable recovery, fundamental improvements in the structure of the economy, especially in the areas of industrial and financial restructuring, are needed. Meanwhile, they argue that it would be very beneficial for medium-term prospects if progress is made on the twin problems of external debt reduction and tax reform.     

Strategic IPOs and product market competition

We examine firms' incentives to go public in the presence of product market competition. As a result of their greater ability to diversify idiosyncratic risk in the capital market, public firms' owners tolerate higher profit variability than owners of private firms. Consequently, public firms adopt riskier and more aggressive output market strategies than private firms, which improves the competitive position of the former vis-à-vis the latter. This strategic benefit of being public, and thus, the proportion of public firms in an industry, is shown to be positively related to the degree of competitive interaction among firms in the output market, to demand uncertainty, and to the idiosyncratic portion of this uncertainty. Additional empirical predictions concern the effect of a firm's initial public offering on its market share and on its rivals' valuations. We test the model's predictions and find empirical support for most of them.     

Competition in the traditional sector does not matter for the ‘Core–Periphery’ model

We modify Paul Krugman’s (1991) ‘Core–Periphery’ model by replacing the traditional competitive sector with a monopolistically competitive one. We show that the structure of spatial equilibria remains the same as in the original model. This result continues to hold true under Cournot or Bertrand oligopolistic competition with free entry in the traditional sector. The key factor that explains why the nature of competition in the traditional sector does not matter for the spatial equilibria is constant expenditure shares–due to nested Cobb–Douglas and CES preferences–which imply that trade in the traditional sector is independent from its sectoral characteristics.     

Trade patterns and export pricing under non-CES preferences

We develop a two-factor, two-sector trade model of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution. Firms' profits and sizes may increase or decrease with market integration depending on the degree of asymmetry between countries. The country in which capital is relatively abundant is a net exporter of the manufactured good, although both firm sizes and profits are lower in this country than in the country where capital is relatively scarce. The pricing policy adopted by firms depends neither on capital endowment nor country asymmetry. It is determined by the nature of preferences: when demand elasticity increases (decreases) with consumption, firms practice dumping (reverse-dumping).     

Understanding Investor Sentiment: The Case of Soccer

We examine the extent to which the stock market's inefficient responses to resolutions of uncertainty depend on investors’ biased ex ante beliefs regarding the probability distribution of future event outcomes or their ex post irrational reactions to these outcomes. We use a sample of publicly traded European soccer clubs and analyze their returns around important matches. Using a novel proxy for investors’ expectations based on contracts traded on betting exchanges (prediction markets), we find that within our sample, investor sentiment is attributable, in part, to a systematic bias in investors’ ex ante expectations. Investors are overly optimistic about their teams’ prospects ex ante and, on average, end up disappointed ex post, leading to negative postgame abnormal returns. Our evidence may have important implications for firms’ investment decisions and corporate control transactions.